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The Six-Day War was fought between June 5 and June 10, 1967, by Israel and the neighboring states of Egypt (then as the United Arab Republic (UAR) ), Jordan, and Syria. The war began with a large-scale surprise air strike by Israel on Egypt and ended with a major victory by Israel. A number of controversies have arisen out of the causes and conduct of the war, namely: whether Israel's action was a preemptive strike justified by the threat of an imminent attack by the Arab states or an unjustified and unprovoked attack; whether the Egyptians killed stragglers from their own forces as they returned from the defeat; whether the Israelis killed unarmed Egyptian prisoners; and the extent of foreign support given to the combatants in the war. ==Preemptive strike v. unjustified attack== Initially, both Egypt and Israel announced that they had been attacked by the other country. Gideon Rafael, the Israeli Ambassador to the UN, received a message from the Israeli foreign office: "inform immediately the President of the Sec. Co. that Israel is now engaged in repelling Egyptian land and air forces." At 3:10 am, Rafael woke ambassador Hans Tabor, the Danish President of the Security Council for June, with the news that Egyptian forces had "moved against Israel" .〔Bailey 1990, p. 225.〕 and that Israel was responding to a "cowardly and treacherous" attack from Egypt…"〔Oren, p. 198.〕 At the Security Council meeting of June 5, both Israel and Egypt claimed to be repelling an invasion by the other,〔 and "Israeli officials – Eban and Evron – swore that Egypt had fired first".〔"Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East" by Michael B. Oren, 2002 (page 196)〕 On June 5 Egypt, supported by the USSR, charged Israel with aggression. Israel claimed that Egypt had struck first, telling the council that “in the early hours of this morning Egyptian armoured columns moved in an offensive thrust against Israel’s borders. At the same time Egyptian planes took off from airfields in Sinai and struck out towards Israel. Egyptian artillery in the Gaza strip shelled the Israel villages of Kissufim, Nahal-Oz and Ein Hashelosha..." In fact, this was not the case,〔(The Case for Palestine: An International Law Perspective; John B Quigley, p. 163 )〕 The US Office of Current Intelligence "...soon concluded that the Israelis – contrary to their claims – had fired first." 〔Robarge, 2007.〕 and it is now known the war started by a surprise Israeli attack against Egypt's air forces that left its ground troops vulnerable to further Israeli air strikes. Though Israel had struck first, Israel initially claimed that it was attacked first. Later it claimed that its attack was a preemptive strike in the face of a planned invasion.〔(BBC Panorama )〕 Israel's position is that, facing economic strangulation and the imminence of war on three fronts, with hundreds of thousands of enemy troops and hundreds of tanks massed on its borders, and given that shipping had been blockaded in the Straits of Tiran (90% of Israeli oil passed through the Straits of Tiran. ), a casus belli in itself, and especially in light of the social and economic impossibility of maintaining her civilian army call-up indefinitely, she felt she had little choice but to initiate preemptive action.〔John Pimlott, ''The Middle East Conflicts 1945 to Present'', Crescent Books, (New York, 1983), p.53〕 According to Israeli historian and former Israeli ambassador to the United States, Michael Oren, the Arabs, "had planned the conquest of Israel and the expulsion or murder of much of its Jewish inhabitants in 1967". Some historians state that the neighboring Arab countries had nevertheless not begun any military actions against Israel so as to warrant an attack. Along with this view, there is a small, yet significant view that the war was an effort for Israel to expand its borders. This, according to Oren, is patently incorrect: Israel had little choice in the matter. "Preemption was the only option."〔"Q&A with Michael Oren," ''Jerusalem Post'', 06/05/2007, http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Q-and-A-with-Michael-Oren〕 Israel's attack is often cited as an example of a preemptive attack and according to a journal published by the US State Department it is "perhaps the most cited example".〔"The United States has often walked a fine line between preemption and prevention. In fact there have only been a handful of clear-cut cases of military preemption by any states in the last 200 years. (Israeli preemption in the Six Day War of 1967 is perhaps the most cited example)” (U.S. National Security Strategy: a New Era ) U.S. Department of State (2002).〕〔"Classic examples of preemptive wars include the July Crisis of 1914 and the Six Day War of 1967 in which Israel preemptively attacked Egypt…" Mueller Karl P. (2007). (Striking first: preemptive and preventive attack in U.S. national security ). (PDF). Rand Corporation. ISBN 978-0-8330-3881-4.〕 One scholar has referred to Israel’s actions as an act of "interceptive self-defense." According to this view, though no single Egyptian step may have qualified as an armed attack, Egypt’s collective actions that included the closure of the Straits of Tiran, the expulsion of UN peacekeepers, the massive armed deployment along Israel’s borders and her constant saber rattling, made clear that Egypt was bent on armed attack against Israel.〔Distein, Yoram, (War, aggression and self-defense ) p. 192, Cambridge University Press (2005)〕 In 2002 radio broadcast NPR correspondent Mike Shuster stated that "()he prevailing view among historians is that although Israel struck first,the Israeli strike was defensive in nature."〔NPR, (The Mideast: A Century of Conflict )〕 Oren, has acknowledged that both US and Israeli intelligence indicated that troop movements in Egypt, taken by themselves, had only defensive, not offensive, purposes. However, he notes that the deployed Egyptian troops in the Sinai would move against Israel in the event that Israel undertook an invasion of Syria toward Damascus in response to repeated provocations by Syrian materiel and raids by fedayeen operating in Syrian territory.〔 This fact was mentioned by Israeli PM Menachem Begin, who, in order to argue for an Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the 80s, reminded the Israeli Knesset that preemptive strikes were already part of Israel's history and that waiting for her enemies to choose the time of coordinated warfare is a losing policy, remarking in regards to the 1967 war that, "The Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. (...) We decided to attack him". But, he added in that speech, the 1967 war was not an act of aggression, but of response to multiple acts of aggression designed to debilitate Israel step by step as a preliminary to outright war.〔Menachem Begin, the first Likud Prime Minister of Israel, also said: "In June 1967, we again had a choice. The Egyptian Army concentrations in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him." "Israel's First Fifty Years", by Robert Owen Freedman, (page 80 ); for another quote, see Cooley, Green March, Black September, p. 162.〕〔(Address by Prime Minister Begin at the National Defense College, 8 August 1982. (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs) )〕 The Arab view was that it was an unjustified attack. M. A. El Kony, Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic (Egypt),remarked at a UN session that "Israel has committed a treacherous premeditated aggression against the United Arab Republic...While we in the United Arab Republic...have declared our intention not to initiate any offensive action and have fully co-operated in the attempts that were made to relieve the tension in the area",〔(UN Security Council meeting 1347 ) (5 June 1967〕 After the war, Israeli officials admitted that Israel wasn't expecting to be attacked when it initiated hostilities against Egypt.〔“Various Israeli officials said later... that 'Israel had not in fact anticipated an imminent attack by Egypt when it struck June 5'”. ( The Case for Palestine: An International Law Perspective, p. 164; John B Quigley )〕〔'Armed Attack' and Article 51 of the Un Charter: Evolutions in Customary Law, by Tom Ruys, page 280 "It has been observed that several official Israeli sources admitted after the war that Egypt did not have the intention of attacking Israel"(link )〕 Mordechai Bentov, an Israeli cabinet minister who attended the June 4th Cabinet meeting, called into question the idea that there was a "danger of extermination" saying that it was "invented of whole cloth and exaggerated after the fact to justify the annexation of new Arab territories."〔(The Myth of Annihilation and the Six-Day War, by Joseph Ryan (Carnegie Council, September 1, 1973) )〕 Israel received reports from the United States to the effect that Egyptian deployments were defensive and anticipatory of a possible Israeli attack,〔U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara told Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban that the U.S. intelligence assessment was that "the Egyptian deployments were defensive in character and anticipatory of a possible Israeli attack". (Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 26, 1967, 10:30 a.m. ); The Israeli ambassador to the U.S. Michael B. Oren has acknowledged that "By all reports Israel received from the Americans, and according to its own intelligence, Nasser had no interest in bloodshed..." Israel's assessment was that "Nasser would have to be deranged to take on an Israel backed by France and the U.S. Sixth Fleet. War, according to the Israelis, could only come about if Nasser felt he had complete military superiority over the IDF, if Israel were caught up in a domestic crisis, and, most crucially, was isolated internationally—a most unlikely confluence." Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, Oren 2002, pp. 59–60).〕 and the US assessed that if anything, it was Israel that was pressing to begin hostilities.〔 Abba Eban, Israel's foreign minister during the war, later wrote in his autobiography that Nasser's assurances he wasn't planning to attack Israel were credible: "Nasser did not want war. He wanted victory without war." 〔Abba Eban: An Autobiography, Random House, 1977. (p. 360)〕 Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld has written that while the exact origins of the war may never be known, Israel's forces were "spoiling for a fight and willing to go to considerable lengths to provoke one".〔(The Sword And The Olive: A Critical History Of The Israeli Defense Force (Martin van Creveld) p. 172 )〕 According to James Thuo Gathii, Israel's case did not meet the Caroline test for anticipatory self-defence, but it was the closest attack ever to the Caroline test.〔ASSESSING CLAIMS OF A NEW DOCTRINE OF PRE-EMPTIVE WAR UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF SOURCES (James Thuo Gathii, OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 43, NO. 1 & 2, 2005) p. 75. (link )"The closest case that might have, but is now regarded as not having met the Caroline test, was Israel’s first strike against Egypt in the 1967"〕 However, Israel also maintains that its attacks were justified by the Egyptian closure of the Straits of Tiran, an international waterway, the closure of which constituted a casus belli under customary international law later codified in 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea. However, since the UAR and its Arab allies were not signatories to the 1958 Geneva Conventions, they argued that since the Gulf of Aqaba was not a waterway connecting two regions of open sea, it was not technically a strait, and therefore that it was not covered by the 1949 ICJ decision ruling that a country is required to allow passage through a strait. Moreover, the UAR disputed Israel's legal right to Eilat, which had been captured after the 1949 armistice imposed by the Security Council. However, the United States and the Western European nations agreed with the Israeli interpretation that Israeli vessels had a right of passage through the Straits of Tiran. On the other hand, Egypt's position was supported by much of the third world.〔John Quigley, The Six-Day War and Israeli Self-Defense (p. 50)〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Controversies relating to the Six-Day War」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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